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Abstract
We analyze the relationship between ECB monetary policy and prudential
policies in the host country and international lending by Dutch insurers and
pension funds, using confidential institution-specific data. Our results suggest
that insurers and pension funds do not significantly change their foreign lending
in response to ECB policy changes, proxied by a shadow rate capturing both
conventional and unconventional monetary policies. However, our findings
suggest that these financial institutions do increase foreign lending when banks
in the host country are more constrained by prudential regulation, pointing to a
substitution effect from banks to non-banks.
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1 Introduction
Monetary policy is a powerful instrument. It can have far-reaching effects on asset
prices, exchange rates, and other financial variables, and on financial institutions’ risk-
taking behavior, and through these transmission channels on output and prices. The
financial effects of monetary policy at the domestic level are the subject of substantial
research (cf. Bernanke and Blinder 1992; Kashyap and Stein 2000; and van den Heuvel
2002), but also the international dimension is receiving increasing attention (see, for
example, Bruno and Shin (2015); Cetorelli and Goldberg 2012; Avdjiev et al. 2016;
Gagnon et al. 2017; and Nsafoah and Serletis 2019).
However, recent studies come to conflicting results regarding both the size and even
the direction of the effects of monetary policy on foreign bank lending (see
Argimón et al. 2019 for a discussion). This paper examines the effects of
monetary policy changes on foreign lending by Dutch insurers and pension
funds, based on confidential institution-specific data for the period 2006:Q1 to
2015:Q4. The effect of monetary policy on non-bank financial institutions has
received hardly any attention in the literature, while insurers and pension funds
play a very important role in the financial sector. In the Netherlands, the
balance sheet of insurers and pension funds amounts to 80% and 120% of
GDP, respectively. More generally, given the shift in credit provisioning in
many economies from banks to non-banks, the response of non-bank financial
institutions to monetary policy is highly relevant.1
In addition, we examine whether prudential policies in host countries affect foreign
lending by Dutch insurers and pension funds. Our work thereby complements previous
research by Frost et al. (2017) who analyze whether foreign bank lending by Dutch
banks was affected by prudential policies in the host countries. Based on an analysis of
the quarterly international claims of twenty-five Dutch banks in sixty-three countries
over 2000–13, these authors report that Dutch banks increase lending in countries that
tighten prudential regulation.2
Our research is part of the International Banking Research Network (IBRN)
project on international spillovers of monetary policy.3 That is why our model
specification is similar to that of Argimón et al. (2019) which focuses on the
impact of central bank policies on international bank lending for the US, Spain
and the Netherlands.
Monetary policy in the Netherlands has been set by the European Central Bank
(ECB) during our sample period. Our time series also contains the period during which
ECB policy rates have reached the effective lower bound (ELB). Since in this situation
nominal interest rates only move marginally and the more general role of interest rates
may change, it is commonly acknowledged that covariation between rates and other
1 The IMF (2016) finds that both banks and non-banks contract their balance sheets when monetary policy
tightens, but that non-bank financial intermediaries do so to a greater extent. Looking only at the insurance
sector, Pelizzon and Sottocornola (2016) find that recent ECB monetary policy generally has a dampening
impact on insurers’ returns, although the effect of interventions changes over time. Neither of these studies
focuses explicitly on the cross-border dimension.
2 Ohls et al. (2017) and Damar and Mordel (2017) find similar results for German and Canadian
banks, respectively.
3 See Buch et al. (2019) for an overview of the project.
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variables, including lending, is almost entirely lost. To deal with this problem we use
changes in the shadow bank rate, defined in Krippner (2015), as our proxy for
monetary policy.
Our results suggest that insurers and pension funds do not respond to ECB monetary
policy, but increase lending when banks in the host country are constrained by
prudential regulation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses our data and describes some
trends. Section 3 discusses our estimation method and presents the results. Section 4
concludes.
2 Data and Trends
2.1 Data
As prudential supervisor De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) collects data from Dutch
financial institutions for a variety of functions. Our data on foreign lending by
insurance companies and pension funds is obtained from the balance of payment
statistics, which contain detailed information on the holdings of assets, split by country
of origin and sector, at an institutional level. An advantage of this granular dataset is
that it contains information on transactions, i.e. the net purchases and sales of assets
corrected for price and exchange rate effects. The data are available at quarterly
frequency over the period 2006Q1-2015Q4. We zoom in on loans and bonds to the
private sector. The private sector is defined as other insurance companies and pension
funds, other financial institutions (excluding banks), households and non-financial
institutions. For the analysis, data on the solvency position and total assets is also
obtained, and stems from supervisory reporting. Our sample consists of 21 insurance
companies and 28 pension funds. These institutions account (by assets) for over 70% of
the Dutch insurance sector and nearly 80% of the Dutch pension fund sector,
respectively.
2.2 Trends in Foreign Lending
Figure 1 shows the evolution of foreign claims of Dutch insurance companies and
pension funds on the private sector. For insurance companies, there is a steady increase
in foreign claims until 2010, when claims began to decline (panel A). In 2010, the share
of foreign lending as a percentage of total lending equaled 36%, while at the end of
2015 this was only 21%. Dutch pension funds exhibit a large decrease in foreign
holdings earlier, after 2009:Q1 (panel B). This decline is technical and is attributed to
these institutions’ shift towards investing in investment funds, which could be
domiciled in the Netherlands but hold foreign securities. For the largest pension funds,
we are able to “look through” the investments via investment funds and as such get
insight in foreign securities invested in by pension funds but via investment funds. In
our analysis, we have conducted a robustness check with this data including the
investments via investment funds.
Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics for all insurance companies and pension
funds in our sample. The foreign claims of both insurers and pension funds,
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representing 10% and 7% of total assets respectively, slightly decreased over the years
2006–2015. Table 1 also shows that, on average, pension funds are slightly larger than
insurance companies. The relatively large standard deviation of the total assets confirm






Fig. 1 Foreign claims of Dutch insurance companies and pension funds (bln EUR)
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3 Empirical Method and Results
3.1 Model4
We use the following regression to explain how changes in ECB monetary policy affect
changes in foreign lending by Dutch pension funds and insurance companies:
ΔYb; j;t ¼ α0 þ ∑
K
k¼0
α1;kΔMPdomestict−k þ α2;kΔMPdomestict−k Frictionb;t−K−1
 þ α3Frictionb;t−K−1
þ α4X b;t−1 þ α5Zdomestict−1 þ α6VIX t−1 þ f j þ f b þ εb; j;t
ð1Þ
where ΔY is the log change of foreign claims of institution b on country j at time t; we
use total claims on foreign private borrowers. We include a vector of institution-specific
controls (Xb, t − 1). More specifically, we control for an institution’s size, solvency, liquid
assets ratio and the international activities ratio.5 To control for conditions in the home
country (Zdomestict−1 Þ, we use proxies for the business cycle, i.e. the GDP gap (BIS 2014),
and the financial cycle, captured by the credit-to-GDP gap (see Drehmann et al. 2011).
We also control for host country characteristics (Zj, t − 1). The business and the financial
cycle proxies for the host country are used to control for host country demand
conditions. As mentioned before, we also consider capital requirements on banks in
destination countries, drawing on the IBRN prudential instrument database as described
in Cerutti et al. (2017). This measure captures tightening or loosening of capital
requirements in destination country j at time t. It has a value of +1 when prudential
measures are tightened, and − 1 when measures are loosened. We use the VIX to
4 This part of the paper heavily draws on the description of the IBRN approach provided in Argimón et al. (2019).
5 Size is measured by total assets and solvency is measured by the total own funds over the solvency
requirements. The liquid assets ratio represents the total cash over assets and the international activities ratio
is measured by the total foreign claims over assets.
Table 1 Summary statistics
Total private foreign
claims/assets







Mean 9.81 −0.03 15.77 349.69
St. Dev. 10.04 0.27 1.53 939.48
Min 0.04 −1.00 12.75 100.92
Max 74.9 1.00 18.36 245.88
Pension funds
Mean 6.92 −0.05 16.38 115.83
St. Dev. 6.57 0.34 1.25 22.39
Min 0.00 −1.00 13.67 0.00
Max 57.77 1.00 19.74 252.70
International Lending of Dutch Insurers and Pension Funds: the... 449
control for international market conditions which may affect changes in the pace of
growth of foreign claims (VIXt − 1). ΔMPdomestict−k is the first difference of the ECB
shadow rate (from Krippner 2015).6 We use K = 3, i.e. monetary policy over the current
and last three quarters (one year in total). For insurers and pension funds the shadow
rate seems to be the best way to capture monetary policy effects on their foreign lending
behavior since these institutions are expected to mainly react to changes in the yield
curve, and not to the short-term policy rate. Lastly, all regressions include host-country
fixed effects and institution fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the institution
level.
The coefficients α1,k and their annual cumulative effect captured by Σ α1,k allow us
to test the overall relationship between ECB monetary policy and the change in foreign
claims. However, this does not provide information on the specific frictions through
which monetary policy affects the international activities of global financial institutions.
This direct relation may also be weakly identified, as credit demand factors are difficult
to control for. We expect that the direct effect of a monetary policy tightening—
captured by Σ α1,k—is negative. To better identify the channels of monetary policy
transmission, we use the technique introduced by Kashyap and Stein (2000) and later
applied by Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012) by introducing a set of regressors labeled
Friction. These variables allow us to identify the effect of monetary policy in the cross-
section of financial institutions, which mitigates some of the concerns related to the
potentially endogenous determination of monetary policy. In the specification, the
coefficients of interest are α2,k, which capture the differential effect of monetary policy
on foreign claims, conditional on these frictions. With α3 we control for the impact of
the friction itself.
3.2 Regressions for Lending by Insurers
Table 2 shows the regression results for insurance companies. The baseline results in
column (1) with the shadow rate as proxy for monetary policy, show that foreign
lending by insurance companies does not respond to changes in monetary policy.
Likewise, the coefficients on the interaction between monetary policy changes and
the solvency rate (column (2)) and the size of insurers (column (3)) turn out to be
insignificant. The overall impact, i.e. the cumulative effect of all coefficients, is
similarly insignificant. However, as shown in column (4), insurers tend to increase
their foreign lending to countries that increase their bank capital requirements. Hence,
the increased activities of insurance companies in these countries can probably be seen
as a substitution for bank lending that may be refrained by higher capital requirements
(see Cizel et al. 2019 for a discussion). In economic terms, insurers lend about 3.8%
6 As pointed out by Claus et al. (2016), the shadow short rate is a synthetic summary measure that is derived
from yield curve data and essentially reflects the degree to which intermediate and longer maturity interest
rates are lower than would be expected if a zero policy rate prevailed in the absence of unconventional policy
measures. This measure is better at capturing the effect of monetary policy on financial institutions’ assets,
especially in the effective lower bound (ELB) period. As policy rates reached the ELB, the value of longer
dates assets may have changed, as several central banks started their quantitative easing programs. The shadow
rate incorporates this information. Although during most of the period under consideration monetary policy
was loosened, there were also periods when policy became more restrictive. For instance, there is a monetary
tightening cycle just prior to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), and again briefly in 2011.
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more a quarter after bank capital requirements were tightened, relative to quarters
where no action was taken. Moreover, insurance companies lend more to countries
with a higher credit-to-GDP gap, representing an upturn in the financial cycle and
potentially more profitable (short-term) investment opportunities. Results (not reported
for brevity) are similar when splitting the sample into the period before and after the
ELB was reached.
Table 2 Insurance companies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ECB policy rate Solvency Size Capital requirements
ΣΔ Domestic















Total effect of ΣΔ MP terms























































































Observations 5200 5029 5029 4727
R2 0.084 0.084 0.082 0.093
R2adj 0.073 0.071 0.070 0.080
This table shows the regression results for all insurance companies over the period 2006Q1-2015Q4. The
dependent variable is the log change in total non-bank private claims to host country j over period t divided by
total non-bank private claims in period t-1. Domestic exposures are excluded. All regressions are estimated by
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) accounting for insurer, quarter and host country fixed effects. Standard errors
are clustered by institution, and ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively
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3.3 Regressions for Lending by Pension Funds
Table 3 shows the regression results for pension funds for the full period 2006Q1-
2015Q4. The results in Table 3 show that, like insurers, pension funds do not increase
their foreign lending in response to monetary policy changes. Likewise, we do not find
evidence for a significant interaction between monetary policy and pension funds’
Table 3 Pension funds
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ECB policy rate Solvency Size Capital requirements
ΣΔ Domestic















Total effect of ΣΔ MP terms























































































Observations 8828 8662 8662 7934
R2 0.100 0.102 0.100 0.103
R2adj 0.092 0.094 0.092 0.095
This table shows the regression results for all pension funds over the period 2006Q1-2015Q4. The dependent
variable is the log change in total non-bank private claims to host country j over period t divided by total non-
bank private claims in period t-1. Domestic exposures are excluded. All regressions are estimated by Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS) accounting for pension fund, quarter and host country fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered by institution, and ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































454 Frost J. et al.
solvency and between monetary policy and pension funds’ size. The overall impact, i.e.
the cumulative effect of all coefficients, is similarly insignificant. The coefficient for
host country capital requirements is positive, but not significant.
As mentioned previously, around 2009 pension funds started to invest more through
investment funds. For the largest pension funds, we are able to “look through” the
investments via investment funds. However, this is only possible from 2009Q2 on-
wards. For robustness, Table 4 therefore shows the regression results over the period
2009Q2-2015Q4, both including (columns 1–4) and excluding (columns 5–8) the
investments via investment funds. The results are quite similar to the ones in Table 3.
However, in the specification including investments via investment funds and in line
with our findings for insurers we find some (weak) evidence that pension funds tend to
increase their foreign lending to countries that increase their bank capital requirements.
A further robustness check has considered the period before and after the ELB was
reached, and again finds similar results.
4 Conclusions
Our results suggest that Dutch insurers and pension funds do not significantly change
their foreign lending in response to ECB monetary policy changes. We do find
evidence, however, that insurers and pension funds react to prudential policy changes.
Both insurance companies and pension funds significantly increase their lending to
countries where banks are getting more constrained by prudential regulation. This
suggests cross-border substitution effects between banks and non-banks, which may
attenuate the intended effects of prudential policies on lending markets and systemic
stability. Further development of these insights is relevant for understanding how
market structure influences international spillovers of monetary policy from different
countries. More work could be done on cross-sector substitution. More work is notably
needed to understand the impact of monetary and macroprudential policies on the
international activities of shadow banks, including certain securitization vehicles and
investment funds. A deeper understanding of the cross-border behavior of different
institutions can help to inform monetary policy and macroprudential analysis. By
helping to quantify spillovers, it can also inform the case for or against international
monetary and regulatory coordination.
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